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R1139Group Decisions: How (Not)
to Choose a Restaurant with Friends
Subordinate baboons voluntarily follow the dominant group member to
foraging patches where they themselves starve. One-sided preservation
of social ties seems to prevail over fair decision sharing, contradicting
recent theory.Larissa Conradt
As humans, we are used to making
decisions not as individuals acting
alone, but collectively and interactively,
as a group. It is obvious that our
sophisticated societies could not
persist without collective decision
making, whether this be choosing a
restaurant with a group of friends,
electing a political leader, or deciding
on international actions to tackle
climate change or financial meltdown.
Because our ability to make
decisions collectively dictates not
only the nature and quality of specific
decision outcomes, but also the
stability of society itself, it is not
surprising that collective decision
making has been a central topic of
philosophy and the social sciences
for millennia (for example, see
Plato’s The Republic written in
360 BC).
What might be less obvious is that
collective decisions are just as
important for other social animals
as they are for humans. Dispersing
swarms of bees and ants collectively
choose new nest sites on which
depend their survival and future
reproduction. Homing and migrating
birds collectively decide on
communal routes that affect their
chances of arriving successfully.
Bats collectively select roosting
sites that are crucial for survival
and breeding. Swarms of insects,
shoals of fish, flocks of birds, groups
of carnivores, herds of ungulates
and troops of primates collectively
decide on the direction of group
movements and the timing of group
activities, with important fitness
consequences to all group members.
Cooperative species, such as
eusocial insects and communal
breeders, collectively decide job
allocation in crucial communal
enterprises, such as supplying food
to the hive, rearing young, defending
the group against predators, and
hunting prey. There are many more
examples.
While the study of collective
decision-making in social animals
is still relatively young, it is now
expanding rapidly [1] and has been
a central theme at several recent
international conferences. However,
with perhaps the exception of
empirical studies on insects [2–5],
theoretical developments [6–10]
have, so far, advanced far ahead
of empirical evidence. The recent
Current Biology paper by King et al.
[11] is a welcome step towards
closing this gap. The study is
remarkable in three respects.
Firstly, the work was done on wild
primates (Figure 1), rather than
on captive or semi-free ranging
ones. Secondly, the work is
experimental, rather than merely
observational, in character. Thirdly,
and most importantly, the studymeasures one of the main
factors considered crucial in
collective decision making
from a theoretical point of view,
namely, the ‘consensus costs’.
These are the costs, to individual
group members, of reaching
a consensus [1,8]. To the best of
my knowledge, this is a first.
King et al. [11] presented two wild
baboon groups with experimental
food patches within their home
ranges, additionally to natural
patches. In experimental patches,
food intake amongst group
members was highly skewed in
such a way that a minority of
(dominant) group members had
a very high food intake, while the
remaining majority of (subordinate)
group members had hardly any
food intake at all. In contrast, in
natural patches, food intake was
relatively evenly spread across
group members. Thus, if the
group chose an experimental over
a natural foraging patch, the majority
of group members would incur
substantial consensus costs in
terms of reduced food intake. On
the other hand, if the group chose
a natural over an experimental
patch, a minority of dominant
members would incur consensus
costs. Theory predicts that, under
such circumstances, groups should
move to the patch that benefits the
majority of group members, and,
thus, minimises overall consensus
costs [6–9]. That is, the group
should choose a natural patch.
What King et al. [11] observed was
exactly the opposite. Both
baboon groups consistently visited
experimental patches in preference
to natural patches. Coercion by
dominant individuals did not play
a role in this choice.
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R1140This is puzzling because it
contradicts almost all recent
theoretical models, which predict
that collective decisions should be
shared fairly equally between group
members, and that consensus
should often be reached in favour
of majority preferences. For
example, majority decisions are
predicted to be more accurate
than decisions led by a dominant
individual [1,6,8,10,12] and
to increase group stability [8];
and selection is predicted to favour
equally shared decisions, over
dominant decisions, under a wide
variety of conditions [7–9]. To
explain the discrepancy between
theory and observation, King et al.
[11] suggest that preserving
social ties is more important for
subordinates than it is for dominants,
so the majority of group members
follow the dominant despite
significant foraging disadvantages.
Modellers have so far little
considered this kind of difference
between group members with
respect to the importance of
social ties. The present study
suggests that this is an omission
that requires correction.
Another potential explanation
could lie in the fact that many group
decision models relate to decisions
about the timing of activities (for
example [7–9]), rather than to
decisions about patch choice, and
that these two types of decision
could differ in principle [1]. In
particular, compromises between
the preferences of individual group
members might make sense with
respect to collective timing
decisions but not with respect to
decisions about where to go. For
example, if my friend prefers to go
to a restaurant at 7pm, whereas I
would prefer 9pm, we might both
happily agree to go at 8pm. By
contrast, if my friend prefers to go
to an Indian restaurant in the North
of town, whereas I would prefer
an Italian restaurant in the East,
there would not be much point in
us going to the North-East of town
where there might be no restaurant
at all. This a priori difference
between the two types of collective
decision could lead to different
predictions about decision sharing
[1], in which case published
theoretical models might not be
applicable to the empirical situation
examined by King et al. [11].
Clearly, theorists need to explore
in greater detail the potential
differences between different types
of collective decision.
One weakness of the paper by King
et al. [11] is the small sample size.
However, this is an intrinsic problem for
studies on group decision-making,
especially when the subjects are
higher vertebrates. The unit of
analysis in group decision-making
Figure 1. Baboons grooming.
Photo credit: Tsaobis Baboon Project/ZSL.studies has to be the group, and
groups have to be of reasonable
size. Consequently, a rather large
number of individuals is usually
required to achieve even a modest
sample size in terms of number of
groups. This poses a problem
even for purely theoretical studies
(for example [7,9]), and is probably
the main reason why empirical
studies are so biased towards
insects. If we want to learn
anything about vertebrate group
decision making, we will probably
have to be content with relatively
small sample sizes for the
foreseeable future.
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